Washington University in St. Louis

Washington University Open Scholarship
Biology Faculty Publications & Presentations

Biology

5-2011

Eugenics and Modern Biology: Critiques of
Eugenics, 1910-1945
Garland E. Allen
Washington University in St Louis

Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/bio_facpubs
Part of the Biology Commons
Recommended Citation
Allen, Garland E., "Eugenics and Modern Biology: Critiques of Eugenics, 1910-1945" (2011). Biology Faculty Publications &
Presentations. 5.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/bio_facpubs/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Biology at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Biology Faculty Publications & Presentations by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information,
please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.

Eugenics and Modern Biology: Critiques of Eugenics, 1910-1945
Garland E. Allen
Department of Biology
Washington University in St. Louis
(Revised 6-30-10)

Abstract
Eugenics in most western countries in the first four decades of the twentieth century was
based on the idea that genes control most human phenotypic traits, everything from
physical features such as polydactyly and eye color to physiological conditions such as the
A-B-O blood groups to mental and personality traits such as “feeblemindedness”,
alcoholism and pauperism. It assessing the development of the eugenics movement – its
rise and decline between 1900 and 1950 – it is important to recognize that its naïve
assumptions and often flawed methodologies were openly criticized at the time by
scientists and non-scientists alike. This paper will present a brief overview of the critiques
launched against eugenicists’ claims, particularly criticisms of the American school led by
Charles B. Davenport. Davenport’s approach to eugenics will be contrasted to his British
counterpart, Karl Pearson, founder and first editor of Annals of Eugenics. It was not the
case that nearly everyone in the early twentieth century accepted eugenic conclusions as the
latest, cutting-edge science. There are lessons from this historical approach for dealing with
similar naïve claims about genetics today.
Introduction
The Annals of Human Genetics was born out of the conviction that understanding
the nature of human heredity would make it possible to improve the biological quality of
the human population. Launched as the Annals of Eugenics, the journal evolved squarely
out of the eugenics movement of the early twentieth century. The journal’s founder and
first editor, Karl Pearson (1857-1936), was the protégé of Francis Galton (1822-1911), the
originator of eugenics as a concept, and the man who coined the term itself (meaning well,
or truly, born). While eugenicists were interested in all aspects of human heredity, they
were particularly concerned with social and personality traits such as intelligence,
“feebemindedness”, criminality, alcoholism, pauperism, and mental disorders such as
schizophrenia and manic depressive insanity. Most eugenicists believed that such traits
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were to a large degree, if not exclusively, genetically determined. The perception was
widespread that these conditions were increasing at a rapid rate in modern industrial
society, and that since “low-grade” individuals with these traits were having more children
than “high-grade” individuals, eventually good traits would be swamped by bad and society
would deteriorate. The answer, according to eugenicists, was to control reproduction by
scientific means in order to increase the number of children born to high-grade, and reduce
the number of children born to low-grade individuals and families. To this end Pearson
launched the Annals of Eugenics as an outlet for up-to-date research that would provide
information on what traits were inherited and what their patterns of inheritance were.
Eugenics, like genetics itself, was an international movement with many variants
(Adams, 1990). Two of the most important movements were those in Britain and the
United States. While sharing many characteristics, the two movements differed in various
ways, reflecting to some important degree the orientation of their respective leaders: Karl
Pearson in Britain and Charles B. Davenport (1866-1944) in the United States. Pearson’s
work was cautious, biometrical, statistical, and highly skeptical of the newly-developing
field of Mendelian genetics. Pearson’s approach is clearly represented in the contents of the
various issues of the Annals of Eugenics under his editorship. Davenport’s approach, on the
other hand, was vociferously Mendelian, and while he understood statistical approaches
better than many of his contemporaries, he made little use of biometry in his eugenical
work.1

1

Davenport had spent part of a sabbatical year (1899-1900) in London with Galton and Pearson learning
the principles of biometry, and shortly afterward became one of the editors of the new journal that Galton
& Pearson founded, Biometrika. Later, differences erupted and Davenport eventually resigned from his
editorial post, but went on to publish a two-volume handbook on biometrical methods.
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In many ways Pearson and Davenport are comparable figures in their respective
eugenics movements. Both had strong academic backgrounds and were among the most
prominent advocates of eugenics. Pearson was the Galton Professor of Eugenics at
University College, London (UCL), and a Fellow of the Royal Society while Davenport
was a one-time faculty member at Harvard and the University of Chicago and a member of
the U.S. National Academic of Sciences and the National Research Council. Both also
headed up their own eugenics research units: Pearson was head of the Galton Laboratory at
UCL, while Davenport, was Director of both the Station for Experimental Evolution
(funded by the Carnegie Institution of Washington from 1904 onward), and the Eugenics
Record Office (funded initially by the Harriman family of New York in 1910, and after
1916 by the Carnegie Institution) at Cold Spring Harbor, New York. Pearson founded his
own eugenics journal (Annals of Eugenics), while Davenport founded Eugenical News in
1910, with his Superintendant at the Eugenics Record Office (hereafter ERO), Harry H.
Laughlin, (1880-1943) as editor. Like the Annals, Eugenical News published papers on
genetics in various organisms alongside papers on human heredity and analysis of family
studies and correlations among relatives. Unlike Annals, Eugenical News, published
articles on aspects of race, immigration and sterilization, reflecting the more strongly
politicized and racialized nature of the eugenics movement in the United States.
Reading through the tables of contents or the pages of either Annals of Eugenics or
Eugenical News today’s readers would never realize there was a good deal of potent
criticism by scientists and non-scientists a like of many, if not all, of the eugenicists’
claims. In one present paper, I will systematically summarize by categore (use of genetics
or statistics, general methodology, a range of criticisms brought against eugenics in its own
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day. This will serve three main purposes: (1) It will make clear that it is not just in
hindsight that eugenics claims seem naïve and racially/socially biased from the outset. (2)
It will provide a summary, in one place, of the range of criticisms launched against
eugenics in its own day. Almost all of the criticisms discussed in this paper have been
discussed by historians of eugenics in existing publications. However, to bring all of the
objections together in one place will emphasize the extent and quality of the critiques that
may not be otherwise apparent. (3) It will help us understand how to approach claims put
forward today about a strong genetic basis for complex social traits such as I.Q.,
criminality, manic depression, sexual orientation, and religiosity (to mention only a few).
I have divided the discussion of criticisms of eugenics into several categories:
criticisms of the basic genetic concepts, criticism of eugenicists’ methodologies (sampling,
data collection, analysis including statistical problems), criticism from a sociological and
political perspective, and finally, criticism of the very moral and ethical basis on which
eugenical ideas were based.

Opposition to the Scientific (Genetic) Basis of Eugenics
General Criticisms
One of the most generally damning evaluations of eugenic work coming out of
Davenport’s Eugenics Record Office was that it was carelessly and sloppily conceived
and executed, and lacked any semblance of normal scientific rigor. Such wide-ranging
criticism appeared early in the history of the movement in 1913 and came from the
Galton Laboratory, under Pearson. The particular studies that provoked the criticism were
a series of papers on the inheritance of mental defect, or “feeblemindedness” by
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Davenport (Davenport, 1912a, 1912b, 1912c), and Henry H. Goddard, author of the
highly-popularized study of the Kallikak family in New Jersey (Goddard, 1912). The
criticisms came in a series of three papers by David Heron (1913), Pearson and J.A.
Jaederholm (1914) and Pearson (1914). All three investigators were strong eugenicists in
their own rights, and felt that poorly conceived and executed work would “cripple the
progress of eugenics” by making it seem slipshod and unscientific (Spencer and Paul,
1998: p. 443). Indeed, Heron claimed that “those of us who have the highest hopes for the
new science of Eugenics in the future are not a little alarmed by many of the recent
contributions to the subject which threaten to place Eugenics with the older ‘social
science’ and much modern sociology – entirely outside the pale of true science” (Heron,
1913: p. 4; quoted in Spencer and Paul, 1998: p. 443).
Of the three critiques coming from the Galton Laboratory, Heron’s was the most
bold and forthright in its criticisms. Heron’s most general criticism was the lack of
critical approach that went into Davenport’s and others’ work on feeblemindedness. He
felt that papers were based on data that “has been collected with a decided bias in favour
of a particular theory of heredity [Mendelism];2 that it is presented with extraordinary
carelessness; that it is, on internal evidence, repeatedly contradictory; that it is not treated
in any adequate statistical manner, and that the conclusions reached are not justified by
the data” (Heron, 1913: p. 12). Heron went on to criticize the assumption of a Mendelian
explanation, when the data should have been collected from an unbiased perspective and
then tested against various theoretical frameworks. He also argued that Davenport’s
assumption of feeblemindedness as the result of a Mendelian recessive gene (expressed in
2

Some lingering suspicion of Mendelian genetics, despite its advances by 1914, may have

colored Heron’s evaluation of the ultra-Mendelian approach taken by Davenport, though Heron
does not seem to have played off biometrical against Mendelian work so much as what he
considered to be the simplistic and uncritical claims made by Davenport and other eugenicists in
the U.S.
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homozygous state) as too simplistic to be believable. In many cases the genetic
characteristics of ancestors was assumed with no corroborating evidence. For example, if
two apparently normal parents produced a feebleminded child (ff), they were assumed to
be heterozygous for feeblemindedness (Ff), and investigators then searched the family
history for other ancestors who could be classified as feebleminded, often reading into
whatever descriptions were available characteristics that could make then appear
feebleminded. There were also instances of what appeared to be sloppy research and
analysis. In some cases text descriptions did not match the case numbers given in the data
tables (Spencer and Paul, 1998: p. 444). In some instances, heterozygotes were described
as normal while in others they were labeled as intermediate between normal and
feebleminded. Moreover, ratios were claimed to follow Mendelian expectations when the
data showed they did not (all summarized from Spencer and Paul, 1998: p. 444).
It was problems of this sort that plagued the hard-line Mendelian eugenics work
in the United States and was apparent (to anyone who looked with any sort of critical
eye) from the start, and which a variety of investigators criticized for the next thirty
years.
We turn now to more specific categories of criticism of eugenic work in the
United States.

Problems in Defining Phenotypes
The most generally pervasive criticism of the genetic basis of eugenics, as
exemplified by Davenport’s interpretation of feeblemindedness, concerned the tendency
to oversimplify. One form of oversimplification lay in the definitions of behavioral or
personality phenotypes themselves. What is "feeblemindedness", “criminality” or "manic
depressive insanity"? A British writer, K.L. Kenrick claimed as early as 1914 that
conditions like "feeblemindedness" are so vague and subjective as to be meaningless
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(Kenrick, 1914: 72). T.H. Morgan made much the same point a decade later when he
pointed out:
The case most often quoted is feeblemindedness that has been said to be
inherited as a Mendelian recessive, but until some more satisfactory
definition can be given as to where feeblemindedness begins and ends, and
until it has been determined how many and what internal physical defects
may produce a general condition of this sort, . . . . it is extravagant to
pretend to claim that there is a single Mendelian factor for this condition
(Morgan, 1925: 200-201).
The same can be said for "intelligence" or "insanity". Morgan pointed out that
intelligence is not a single entity, but that there are many kinds of intelligences:
The main difficulty is one of definition. It is commonly assumed that
there is one, and only one, criterion of intelligence -- that we are speaking
always of the same thing when we use the word. . . In reality our ideas are
very vague on the subject. Accurate work in heredity can only be attained
when the diagnosis of the elements of a situation is known (Morgan, 1932:
207-210).
Morgan went on to say that
The inheritance of derangements of the mental faculties of man is a very
difficult problem, partly because there are few, if any, parallels in other
animals that can be experimentally tested, partly because the diagnosis in
man is often uncertain, and partly because the environment is a
complicating agency . . . (ibid).
It is important to note here that Morgan emphasized that the preconditions for accurate
work in genetics is a clear definition of the phenotypes being investigated. A similar
variation of this argument is that voiced by social psychologist J.B. Eggen, who pointed
out that terms like "feeblemindedness" or "insanity" covers a multitude of specific
components and are not a single entity:
The term [insanity] designates a wide variety of functional disorders, and
not by the widest stretching of the imagination can they all be grouped
together and considered as an entity. . . [mathematical ability, musical
ability, immorality, alcoholism] are not single definite things, which can
be inherited as a unit. They are complex and variable factors, not one of
which can ever be thought of as a unit or entity (Eggen, 1926: 885).
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Abraham Myerson, a neurologist at Tufts College Medical School and his colleagues
from the Neurological Association of America also made this same point over and over
again in their 1936 evaluation of eugenical sterilization, pointing out that the relationship
between various psychoses "is not close enough to warrant the postulate of any
widespreading unitary trait back of all psychoses . . . Consequently, a great deal of the
work that has been done is entirely invalid and has only historical significance" (Myerson
et al, 1936: 88). The authors go on to name Davenport and the Cold Spring Harbor
investigators in particular, as having done work that was so vague and sloppy as to be
worthless.
It is not necessary to multiply examples endlessly to underscore the fact that many
critics found the very first step in a genetic study -- precise definition of phenotype -seriously wanting in much eugenic research.

Oversimplification of Genetic Models: The Unit-Character Concept
Equally problematic was the tendency, especially of the American school to
postulate simple Mendelian factors to explain complex behaviors -- i.e., they worked
under the unit-character concept of early Mendelism (Ludmerer, 1972: 62; Morgan,
1932; Jennings, 1927). The unit-character concept is based on the assumption of a oneto-one relationship between a phenotypic character and a Mendelian gene. Thus, there is
a gene for eye color, another for stature, and yet another for feeblemindedness. Herbert
Spencer Jennings (1868-1947), a Zoologist & protozoan geneticist at Johns Hopkins
University, was particularly critical of this concept by the late 1920s, arguing that most
knowledgeable geneticists had rejected it 10-15 years previously:
". . . from the fact that the 'unit characters' changed when a single gene
changed, it was concluded that in some ill-defined way, each characteristic
was 'represented' or in some way condensed and contained, in one
particular gene. . . There is indeed no such thing as a 'unit character', and it
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would be a step in advance if that expression should disappear. . . . The
doctrine is dead." (Jennings, 1924: 237)
Similarly, Myerson et al state that
"There is now on record a considerable body of evidence to show that
often a few and sometimes many genes in the residual hereditary
background of an individual affect the expression of a single gene being
studied. . . .[In terms of fluctuating characters] there is little doubt but that
this fluctuation is due to modifying factors in the residual heredity of the
individual . . . " (Myerson et al, 1936: 73-74).
That Davenport could, as late in the development of Mendelian genetics as 1919, publish
an account of thalassophilia (love of the sea) as a Mendelian, sex-linked recessive found
in the families of naval officers only underscores the height of oversimplification
embodied in the unit-character concept still rampant in American eugenical thinking.

Oversimplification of Genetic Models: Gene-Environment Interactions
Moving beyond the gene, the problems of definition are only compounded at the
next step of eugenical investigation, namely the collection of data on members of families
and their organization into pedigrees. Much of the data collected was itself anecdotal,
making any further use of it questionable. L.C. Dunn and the Visiting Committee to the
Eugenics Record Office at Cold Spring Harbor in 1930 and again in 1937 made this point
abundantly clear.

After the first visit the Committee criticized Laughlin's and

Davenport's reliance on so much subjective evaluation of cases by their fieldworkers
(Allen, 1986: 251). The second report was more direct and scathing:
"The records, upon which so much effort and money have been expended,
have to date been extremely little used, to judge by the number of
publications based upon them. Thus the Office [Eugenics Record Office]
appears to be accumulating large amounts of material, and devoting a
disproportionately great amount of time and money to a futile system for
indexing it, without certainty, or even good probability, that it will ever be
of value." (quoted in Allen, 1986: 251).
This report, along with Davenport's retirement and Laughlin's declining health, sealed the
fate of the Eugenics Record Office, whose funding ceased as of December 31, 1939.
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The individual pedigrees constructed from eugenic family studies were also of
questionable value.

Morgan noted that pedigrees confounded effects transmitted

biologically with those transmitted culturally, and by themselves proved nothing about
the nature of inheritance of behavioral, personality, or mental traits.

Speaking of

pedigrees of so-called degenerate or "cacogenic" families, Morgan wrote:
"The pedigrees that have been published showing a long history of social
misconduct, crime, alcoholism, debauchery, and venereal diseases are
open to the same criticism [i.e., conflating biological and social heredity]
from a genetic point of view; for it is obvious that these groups of
individuals have lived under demoralizing social conditions that might
swamp a family of average persons. It is not surprising that, once begun
from whatever cause, the effects may be to a large extent communicated
rather than inherited." (Morgan, 1925: 201-202).
Given that Davenport himself had published detailed family pedigrees showing
"inheritance" of pellagra (a niacin, or vitamin B1 deficiency) in 1916 only makes
Morgan's point more obvious (Davenport, 1916). As Morgan pointed out, families share
social practices, including diets, as well as genes.
It was obvious that pedigrees do not separate genetic from environmental effects,
and eugenicists themselves were well aware of the problem. Early on, A.M. CarrSaunders in Britain, in an exhaustive critique of much eugenics work up to 1914, pointed
out that in their zeal to show biological heredity many eugenicists overlooked the role of
environment (Carr-Saunders, 1914). As a neo-Lamarckian, Carr-Saunders observed that
it was theoretically impossible to ever separate rigorously the effects of heredity from
those of environment in any individual case. In addition, by such zealous emphasis on
heredity eugenicists were showing an insensitivity to the value of changing social
practices in improving the lot of their fellow human beings. Major Leonard Darwin
(Charles Darwin’s son) sounded the call for eugenicists not to give the appearance of
ignoring all social or educational reform, lest they lose all credibility:
"What I am desirous of suggesting on this occasion is that the keenest
advocates of eugenics are in danger of urging their views in such a way as
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to produce false impressions; for by perpetually harping on the vastly
greater importance of heredity as compared with environment, a false
belief may, and I think, at times has been created that they are careless
concerning many reforms intended to improve the lot of human beings by
improving human surroundings." [And, quoting from Galton, he
continues, eugenicists must] "state from time to time in the most definite
manner possible that we do not deny the great influence of environment,
and that we 'acknowledge freely the great power of education and social
influences in developing the active powers of the mind'." (Darwin, 1916:
93-94).
To Leonard Darwin and the more thoughtful eugenicists, heredity and environment worked
together and all social programs should be grounded in that realization.
In the inter-war period, gene-environment interaction became an increasingly
prominent theme among critics of eugenics in the United States. T.H. Morgan was one
who repeatedly echoed this sentiment. Although a leader in the development of the
atomistic gene concept, Morgan was always an embryologist at heart, and recognized the
importance of environmental input into the development of any phenotype.

After

reviewing the "best case" evidence for the inheritance of mental traits (e.g., Huntington's
chorea, considered a form of degenerative insanity at the time) Morgan pointed out the
grave difficulty in trying to separate genetic from environmental influences in human
beings:
"If these 'best cases' are so far from being established on a scientific
footing, it is not particularly profitable to discuss the many claims that
have been set up for other mental traits . . . The important point, however,
to be urged is that the 'mental traits' in man are those that are most often
the product of the environment which obscures to a large extent their
inheritance, or at least makes very difficult their study." (Morgan, 1925:
203).
With regard to even more vague characteristics such as "intelligence," Morgan was
doubly skeptical:
"The difficulty, of course, is -- aside from our inability to define what is
meant by intelligence -- that we do not know here how much is due to
nature and how much to nurture." (Morgan, 1932: 209)
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Indeed, Morgan goes on to speak of "the two-fold method of human inheritance . . .",
meaning, of course, cultural/social and biological inheritance, and of the difficulty in
distinguishing between them.
Franz Boas (1858-1942), Professor of Anthropology at Columbia University and a strong
opponent of eugenics from the start, wrote in Scientific Monthly as early as 1916, that it would
seem the first obligation of the eugenicist ought to be to determine what traits are truly inherited
and which ones are not. "Unfortunately," he wrote, "this has not been the method pursued,"
the battle-cry of the eugenists, 'Nature not nurture,' has been raised to the rank of a
dogma, and the environmental conditions that make and unmake man, physically
and mentally, have been relegated to the background." (F. Boas, "Eugenics,"
Scientific Monthly 3 (1916): 471-478).
Eugenicists, Boas complained, simply assumed that most traits were inherited (which
was, of course, the point to be proven in the first place) and then proceeded to argue
about what the pattern of inheritance was.
Physiological chemist Oscar Riddle (1877-1968), who had carried out much work
on endocrine function, particularly the role played by hormones in growth and
development,3 was sensitive to the apparent disregard most eugenicists had for the role of
the environment in the development of human mental and behavioral traits. In his view,
genes were not rigid determiners, but their output, whatever it was, could be significantly
influenced by external factors:
"It has become clear that the specific conditions under which a gene or
factor operates and develops have an equal value with the germinal factors
in the appearance of anything that can be called heredity." (Riddle, 1928:
62-71).

3

Riddle was a distinguished endocrinologist who discovered the hormone prolactin responsible for
stimulating the production of milk in the mammary glands. He was a member of the National Academy of
Sciences (USA) and, ironically, a long-time researcher (1913-1945) at Davenport’s Station for
Experimental Evolution at Cold Spring Harbor, the parent institution of the Eugenics Record Office.
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Riddle would have agreed with modern statements to the effect that there can be no gene
expression without an environment in which that expression takes place, and in which the
gene’s expression is not affected in some way by that environment.
Meanwhile, in their lengthy critique of eugenics from a neurological perspective,
Myerson et al repeatedly speak of the environment as a releasing agent for the genes,
thus demonstrating their recognition of the gene-environment interaction that is the
precondition for development of all traits. To extend their analysis further, Myerson et al
point out that the role of genetic modifying factors made it extremely unlikely that any
behavioral or social traits are controlled by single genes, thus making any sort of detailed
genetic analysis (without breeding experiments) theoretically impossible (Myerson et al,
1936: p. 74).
Among the most prominent and thorough-going criticisms of the unit-character,
or single-gene effect was H.S. Jennings. Jennings approached the problem of heredity
from a more holistic and integrative position than most of his contemporaries, and hence
to him the oversimplifications of the eugenicists seemed particularly outmoded and
dangerous.

In a thorough and insightful analysis of Jennings' biological and

philosophical background, Judy Johns Schloegel has argued that Jennings approached
eugenics from both a strong social-political and pragmatic platform (Schloegel, 2006).
Strongly influenced by both John Dewey's pragmatism and C. Lloyd Morgan's concept of
emergent evolution, Jennings understood better than most of his contemporaries that (1)
the whole (an organism, for example) is greater than the sum of its parts, and that (2) the
interactions among the parts give rise to new, or emergent, properties that could not have
been predicted from knowing only the individual components. Jennings was trying to
fashion a materialist biology that avoided the (to him) meaningless alternatives of either
mechanism or vitalism. In 1924 Jennings published a critique of eugenics, “Heredity and
Environment”, derived in part from his written testimony to the House Committee on
Immigration and Naturalization, which he had prepared to counter Harry H. Laughlin’s
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claims about the genetic inferiority of southern and eastern Europeans. In this article
Jennings pointed out that gene-environment interactions are crucial to understanding the
nature of heredity:
"[N]ot only what the cell within the body shall become, but what the
organism as a whole shall become, is determined not alone by the
hereditary materials it contains, but also by the conditions under which
those materials operate. Under diverse conditions the same set of genes
will produce very diverse results. It is not true that a given set of genes
must produce just one set of characters and no other. . . .It is not true that
what an organism shall become is determined, foreordained, when he [sic]
gets his supply of chemicals or genes in the germ cells, as the popular
writers on eugenics would have us believe. The same set of genes may
produce many different results, depending on the conditions under which
it operates." (Jennings, 1924: 232-233)
Jennings went on to say that "what the body as a whole shall become – depends not alone
on what it contains – its heredity – but also its relation to many other conditions; on its
environment." (Ibid, 230-231). Proceeding on an anti-reductionist, developmentallyoriented line of reasoning, Jennings had occasion to point out that genes were not destiny:
"The characteristics of the adult are no more present in the germ cells than
are those of an automobile in the metallic ores out of which it is ultimately
manufactured." (Jennings, 1925; quoted in Myerson et al, 1936: 77).
Jennings had an appreciation for the process of embryonic development, akin to the
process of manufacturing a car. In development, all genes acted against a background of
other genes plus input from the environment. The blueprint for a car or the genes for an
organism only materialize in the context of materials supplied from the outside, and the
nature of these can affect in critical ways, the overall outcome (structure of the car or
phenotype of the organism). No matter how precise the blueprints (genetic elements
inherited from the parents) the ultimate and detailed form of the product (the offspring’s
phenotype) was always strongly influenced by environmental inputs.
It is important to point out that most eugenicists claimed they realized that
environmental factors played a role in determining phenotypes, especially for human
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personality and social traits. In his article, “Crime, Heredity and Environment” in 1928,
for example, Davenport acknowledged that what is considered criminal varies from
culture to culture: “Crime is always a relative thing, having relation to the mores or to the
behavior that is expected of one. In one country bigamy is a crime; in another it is the
conventional mode of life.” (Davenport, 1928: p. 307). He goes on to acknowledge that
crime is not a simple phenomenon: “We are dealing with a broad field of action or rather
of interaction between persons and their surrounding world, involving numerous stimuli
and varied response.” (Ibid). After reviewing the claims of both sociologists, who argued
that criminality is due solely to environment, and criminal anthropologists of the
Lombroso school4, who argued that it is all biologically innate, Davenport takes what
seems like the reasonable position that the causal factors vary from case to case and
probably both are involved to some extent in all cases (Ibid: p. 308). However, the
remainder of the article is devoted to examining cases of hereditary crime, on the
grounds that since most people have inherited good social and altruistic instincts and thus
do not commit crimes, the phenomenon to be explained are the exceptions, the habitual or
hereditary criminals. Davenport’s tactic here is fairly representative of many eugenicists:
they acknowledge or pay lip-service to the role of environmental factors, or of geneenvironment interactions, but then proceed to discuss only the genetic side of the
equation.

Methodological Problems: Experimental Design, Analysis of Data, Mode of
Reasoning

4

Cesare Lombroso (1835-1909), an Italian psychiatrist and founder of the field of “criminal anthropology”
in the 1890s, argued that criminals are a degenerate sub-set or “race” of the human species characterized by
visible, atavistic features (what he called “stigmata”) that allowed detection of the criminal, with
correlations even between particular stigmata and particular types of crime. Although Lombroso’s claims
were largely rejected by the 1920s, he is credited with shifting criminology from a purely legalistic to a
more scientific, some have said more “humane” approach. Davenport did not accept Lombroso’s findings
but did appreciate his attempt to understand criminals as “born” rather than made.

16

A number of critics picked up on eugenicists' poor design of studies, circular
reasoning, poor use of statistics, and a tendency to draw sweeping conclusions that went
far beyond what the available data allowed.
In the process of data-gathering, a number of critics noted that eugenicists
gathered largely anecdotal evidence, by self-administered questionnaires or other means
whose uniformity or accuracy could not be verified (Heron, 1913; Morgan, 1925;
Jennings, 1924). Laughlin sent out hundreds of eugenical questionnaires to college
students asking about family backgrounds, conditions known to exist in their families,
and the like – data that was wholly dependent on the recipient’s reliability, accuracy and
ability to gain information about family members. In an era before the routine preparation
of medical records, much of the information on which family studies were made was
gained by hearsay and guesswork. Even the trained field workers from the Eugenics
Record Office often had to accept family and community rumors (i.e., gossip), or make
their own subjective assessments of the family members they met. For example, Anna
Wendt Finlayson, an ERO fieldworker who studied the Dack family, descendants of Irish
immigrants in western Pennsylvania, gave the following descriptions of William Dack,
whom she had not met:
“William died almost fifty years ago, but he is remembered by a few of
the oldest settlers of the locality as a peculiar, silly old fellow who drank a
good deal, stole sheep and household valuables from his neighbors, and
did not seem to be very intelligent . . . William’s second wife a Mary
Murphy . . . An old resident of Bushville, now deceased, once stated to a
woman who was interviewed by the writer [Finlayson] that William and
Mary were first cousins.”
And of James Dack, whom she did meet:
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“James Dack was commonly known as ‘Rotten Jimmy’, the epithet was
given because of the diseased condition of his legs, which were covered
with chronic ulcers, although the term is said to have been equally
applicable to his moral nature. He was a thief and a general good-fornothing, but neither shrewd nor cunning. His conversation quickly
revealed his child-like mind.” (Finlayson, 1916: pp 6-7).
On the basis of such information family pedigree charts such as the one for the Dacks
shown in Figure 1, were constructed and genetic hypotheses proposed to explain the
individuals’ phenotypes in Mendelian terms.
There were also problems of sampling error that greatly skewed results (usually in
favor of eugenicists’ arguments). One example will suffice, again from the ERO. To
demonstrate that immigrants from different countries had hereditary differences in their
tendency toward crime, in 1921 Harry Laughlin sent questionnaires to the
superintendents of prisons across the country asking them to list their inmates by
nationality. Laughlin then compared the per-cent of each nationality incarcerated against
the per-cent of that nationality in the general population. A rating of 1.0 would be what
was expected for any nationality if there were no differential hereditary tendencies to
criminality from one national group to another. The results Laughlin compiled and
presented to the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization (as Expert Eugenic
Witness) showed what eugenicists in the United States had long claimed: northern
European countries showed a level at or below 1.0, meaning they were underrepresented
in prison, while southern and eastern European, as well as Mediterranean, Balkan and
Russian populations were well above 1.0, meaning they were overrepresented in the
prison population (Laughlin, 1923: Chart 3, opposite p. 740). The results supported the
initial assumption that northern Europeans (read “Nordic”) were genetically more
socially responsible while southern Europeans and Slavics had a greater inherited
tendency toward criminal activities.
Laughlin’s data and conclusions were analyzed and strongly criticized by Joseph
Gilman, a Professor in the School of Business Administration at the University of
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Pittsburgh (Gilman, 1924). Gilman noted that Laughlin had not corrected his sample for
age or sex, especially important for comparisons since incarcerated populations tend to be
largely male, between the ages of 20-30, while the general population includes both
males and females and all ages (Gilman, 1924). It was also well known, Gilman pointed
out, that immigrant populations tend to include more males, since men come first to find
work and establish themselves before bringing over their families. For the year 1916,
Gilman noted, the number of inmates in state and federal prisons contained twelve times
more men than women, yet only if the number of males in the general immigrant
population were also twelve times greater, would the difference between immigrant and
non-immigrant groups be significant (Gilman, 1924: p. 40). Laughlin had not collected
data on the per-cent of males in immigrant populations, thus rendering any comparison
problematic.
In an even greater difficulty, Gilman noted that Laughlin’s survey of prison
populations was carried out in 1921, whereas the general population figures for
comparison were taken from the census of 1910 (rather than 1920). Since general
immigration rates were increasing between 1910 and 1914, and shot up dramatically after
the war ended (1919), immigrant groups were underrepresented in the 1910 compared to
the 1920 census, artificially inflating the per-cent of the 1921 prison figures. Laughlin
actually noted this problem and claimed that he used the 1910 census to correct for what
he thought was a “lag factor”, that is, there would usually be a lag time between an
immigrant’s arrival and the chances they would be arrested and imprisoned. Thus, if he
had used the 1920 census, Laughlin claimed, it would have artificially lowered the
institutional per-centages (Laughlin, 1923: pp. 828-830). Among the other factors that
skewed Laughlin’s results, Gilman noted, was that the response rate of prison authorities
to Laughlin’s questionnaire was much higher from the northeast than from any other part
of the country. Since immigrants from Europe were more concentrated in the northeast,
the prison numbers reflected the prison populations in that geographic area, while the
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census, of course, reflected the population of the country as a whole. Laughlin had either
not noticed the geographically skewed returns, or had decided not to comment on them
(Allen, 2001).
Another methodological issue is the failure of eugenicists to consider seriously,
and test, alternative explanations for the causes of mental and social behaviors. Although
not a biologist, journalist and essayist Walter Lippmann (1889-1974), took on the
eugenicists broadside in the 1920s over everything from immigration and sterilization to
I.Q. tests and education. Lippmann pointed out that the results of the acclaimed Army
Intelligence Tests administered during World War I by Robert M. Yerkes of Harvard
(and a committed eugenicist) started with the assumption that intelligence was inherited,
and collected test data on recruits (1,700,000 of them). When the data was analyzed by
Princeton psychologist Carl Brigham in 1923, he found a startling correlation between
length of residence of immigrants in the United States and their performance on the tests.
Brigham’s conclusion, with which Yerkes agreed, was that the quality of immigrants had
been declining for at least several decades (Brigham, 1923: pp. 110-111). However,
Lippmann found that a far more compelling correlation existed between scores on the
tests and number of years of schooling (Lippmann, 1923: 97). Further, arranging group
scores by region of the U.S., and by availability of schools (per capita) in these regions,
yielded another more significant correlation. Could not education, Lippmann asked,
account for a large amount of higher scores compared to lower scores on the tests?
Lippmann was sophisticated enough to realize that correlations do not prove causality,
but his point was that the psychologists such as Brigham, who were also staunch
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eugenicists, had not bothered to make such comparisons themselves. They simply proved
what they started out believing.
There were also problems with the use or misuse of statistics. In Laughlin’s crime
data presented to Congress, for example, Joseph Gilman noted that while Laughlin
reported the standard error (SE) for his calculations of percent incarcerated, he made no
use of the data in his analysis, a particularly glaring omission when the SE was large. On
a similar note, in the study on race-crossing in Jamaica Davenport and Morris Steggerda,
made much of what they claimed to be the greater variability of traits in “browns”, that is
offspring of one white and one black parent, than in offspring of white parents or black
parents. In making this argument Davenport presented variability as standard deviation of
52 physical traits that Steggerda had measured in Jamaica. But physical anthropologist
Wilson D. Wallis argued that Davenport should have used the coefficient of variation
(standard deviation divided by the mean of each population), since the populations under
consideration (whites, blacks and browns) all had different means for the traits that were
examined (Wallis, 1938: p. 686, 690, 692; see also Altink, 2006: pp. 69-70). As Wallis
pointed out, using standard deviation alone did appear to support the claim of greater
variability among hybrids, but when coefficient of variation was calculated, all but a few
traits (nasal breadth, for example) showed less variability in browns than in either blacks
or whites (Ibid: p. 692, and Table 7). The generalization that hybrids between two
populations always show greater variability seemed to Wallis to be, at best, a moot point;
at worst, it was simply untrue. It was apparent that Davenport used the statistic that
would give him the results he wanted, since he had argued that race-crossing was
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“disharmonious” and that greater variability meant greater disharmonies (Davenport,
1928, 1929).
Practical Problems of Eugenics
A number of criticisms of eugenics touched on the practical problem of achieving
eugenic goals even if those goals seemed desirable. Among the problems were of course
the social, ethical and legal issues surrounding methods like compulsory (or even
voluntary) sterilization. But from the biological and genetic perspective, there were
problems, too. One was that if most pathological conditions were truly recessive, it would
take generations to truly eradicate them from the population. Especially after the rise of
population genetics, it was realized that earlier hopes of quick solutions to social
problems through eugenic measures were naïve and unrealistic (Kevles, 1985).
On the other side of the coin, critics such as T.H. Morgan pointed out that social
reforms would be a far more quick and effective way to deal with many of the problems
eugenicists wanted to solve through genetics. As he wrote in 1925:
"Social reforms might, perhaps, more quickly and efficiently get at the
root of a part of the trouble, and until we know how much the environment
is responsible for, I am inclined to think that the student of human heredity
will do well to recommend more enlightenment on the social causes of
deficiencies rather than more elimination in the present deplorable state of
our ignorance as to he causes of mental differences." (Morgan, 1925: 205)
Morgan later (1932) compared the basic method of dealing w/ mental defects to that with
communicable diseases: In the past we could have bred for greater resistance to cholera or TB,
but it was quicker and more satisfactory to clean up the environment and thereby eliminate the
pest, than to change the human constitution (Morgan, 1932: 210-211). He concludes with a
strong humanitarian plea:
"If within each human social group the geneticist finds it impossible to
discover, with any reasonable certainty, the genetic basis of behavior, the
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problems must seem extraordinarily difficult when groups are contrasted
with each other where the differences are obviously connected not only
with material advantages and disadvantages resulting from location,
climate, soil and mineral wealth, but with traditions, customs, religious,
taboos, conventions, and prejudices. A little goodwill might seem more
fitting in treating these complicated questions that the attitude adopted by
some of the modern race-propagandists." (Morgan, 1925: 207).
The gist of Morgan’s argument was that even if genetic factors might be involved in
leading to certain social or mental conditions, it would make far more sense to search out
the social components involved, since those could be changed more readily. It would not
require multiple generations to provide better schools, clean up ghettos and improve
living conditions (including public health measures), and these would inevitably have an
ameliorating effect for everyone.
A considerable number of critiques of specific eugenics social programs –
immigration restriction and the various proposals for compulsory sterilization – were
advanced as those campaigns became prominent in the public arena. I will not discuss
here the many objections to eugenics on moral, ethical, legal and religious grounds, as
those have been discussed by others would take us too far afield from the topic of the
present paper. This is not in any way to diminish the importance, indeed, the centrality of
such arguments in the larger picture of the history of eugenics. They were certainly part
of the discussion in their own day. But they all raise questions which would require a
lengthier discussion that is possible here.5

Conclusion
In many ways this paper has only scratched the surface of the variety of scientific
arguments brought against eugenics in the first forty years of the twentieth century. What
5

For more detail on critiques of the immigration issue in the U.S., see Hassencahl, 1970; Ludmerer, 1972;
Chase, 1977; Paul, 1995; Allen, 2001. Objections to the various sterilization laws have also been treated
extensively by a variety of scholars (Myerson et al, 1936; Robitscher, 1973; Reilly, 1991, esp. Chapter 8;
Reilly, 1991; Kline, 2001, especially Chapters 2-3; Largent, 2008). One of the best discussions of the moral
and ethical aspects of eugenic thinking is Troy Duster’s Backdoor to Eugenics (2003).
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conclusions can emerge from this overview of criticisms of eugenics? How can it help us
understand several important questions, both historical and contemporary? Among these
questions the most important seem to me to be: (1) Historically, did the criticisms
launched from within the scientific community as well as by informed and influential lay
writers, have any influence on the course of the eugenics movement? (2) And, depending
on the answer to the first question, what can the history tell us about dealing with similar
claims today about the genetic basis of many human social behaviors and mental
conditions?
In answering the first question, it is important to note first that although there
were various criticisms of eugenics in the first two decades of the century, their number
and visibility increased noticeably after 1925. Especially in the United States I would
suggest this may have come as a response to two major public issues in which eugenics
was highly influential: (1) the heated, nativist and very public debates surrounding
immigration restriction, and (2) the U.S. Supreme Court decision on Buck v Bell (1927),
which upheld as constitutional a Virginia Sterilization statute of 1924 allowing for
forcible sterilization of institutionalized individuals. As blatant racial and anti-ethnic
biases were aired in the immigration debates, a number of geneticists, as well as others,
began to realize that eugenics was not just oversimplified or bad scientific theory, but that
it was being used to influence far-reaching and significant political and social policy. It is
certainly clear that from the mid-1930s onward, when the National Socialist government
in Germany was making eugenics and race a cornerstone of their national policy, a
number of geneticists, particularly in Europe, began to take notice with more public
responses.
What little published criticism existed prior to 1920 probably had little influence
on the course of the movement as a whole. Indeed, it was in the inter war years that
eugenics moments everywhere reached their apogee. In the post-1925 period, however,
considerably more criticism was published by well-known geneticists (T.H. Morgan, H.J.
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Muller, Raymond Pearl, and H.S. Jennings in the United States, J.B.S. Haldane, Lancelot
Hogben, Lionel Penrose and Julian Huxley in England, and Otto Mohr in Norway, among
others), and at the very least this signaled that eugenics did not have the unqualified
support of the entire genetics community. All historians agree that by the early-to-mid
1930s, eugenics movements in most countries were in decline, but there has been
considerable debate about the possible reasons. A number of factors may have been
involved: (1) the economic effects of the 1929 depression, which reduced funding
prospects and also indicated that people’s economic and social status could be
dramatically affected by external conditions; (2) the fact that eugenics as an ideology
promoting the interests of its ruling class financial supporters (providing a biological
rationale for a hierarchical view of society) had served its purpose; and (3) the scientific
criticism itself. With regard to the latter, the question is on whom, if anyone, did the
criticism have an effect?
It is clear that scientific criticism did not have much effect on “mainline”
eugenicists, such as Davenport, Laughlin, Morris Steggerda, or Madison Grant. Most
reacted defensively to criticism and virtually never changed their minds from their
earliest to their later works. Notable exceptions were Henry H. Goddard and Carl
Brigham, both of whom later recanted their claims about the strong genetic basis of
mental ability and the meaning of national differences in performance on mental tests.
Younger eugenicists in the United States, such as Frederick Osborn, a former New York
railroad executive (he retired at 45)6, and long-time Secretary of the American Eugenics
Society, and later President of the Pioneer Fund, certainly took to heart the criticism of
blatant racism and jingoism and tried to steer the eugenics movement in a slightly
different direction, away from the kind of work done at Cold Spring Harbor. It is not
6

The Pioneer Fund was established in 1937 by wealthy textile magnate Wycliffe Draper, with Laughlin as
its first president. Osborn succeeded Laughlin in 1942. He was later replaced by Draper for being too
liberal on racial issues. For a detailed and chilling history of the Pioneer Fund, which still exists, see
Tucker (2002).
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likely that the scientific criticism had a major impact on the educated public in general. In
fact, eugenic ideas were still being included in high school biology textbooks well into
the 1940s and 1950s (Selden, 1999).
In the United States at least, the scientific criticism may have had its greatest
impact on the philanthropic foundations, particularly the Carnegie Institution of
Washington and the various Rockefeller entities, giving them cause to reconsider
allocation of their funds. As early as 1923 John C. Merriam, President of the Carnegie
Institution of Washington had sought the advice of Morgan, Pearl and other geneticists
about the quality of all the work (the genetics work in particular) at Cold Spring Harbor
under Davenport’s direction. All responded that the work was mostly second or third rate
and poorly planned with little coordination (Allen, 2004). And as we have seen, in 1930
and 1935 Merriam convened had a special visiting committee to evaluate the eugenics
work of the ERO, which was found seriously wanting. It seems clear that the Carnegie
Institution was becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the ERO in particular by the late
1930s, but to what extent the scientific criticism played a key role, is not clear; it is
difficult to imagine, however, that it was inconsequential.
Regarding the second question: What can we learn from looking at the history of
criticism by scientists of the old eugenics movement that might be relevant today in
dealing with claims about a significant genetic basis for mental and social traits, and for
issues of reproductive choice? I will focus on only one aspect of this rather large
question, and that is the role of open criticism in both the scientific and popular, public
arenas. Perhaps the most important lesson coming out of the scientific response to the
eugenics movement, was that prior to 1925 there was not a great deal of open, published
criticism, and what there was remained largely in academic journals. In 1915 Morgan, for
example, resigned from the Committee on Animal Breeding of the American Breeders’
Association )the grounds that it was claiming more than it could scientifically justify) but
he did so privately in a letter to Davenport (Allen, 1978: pp. 228-229). Others who had
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doubts also expressed them in private correspondence but did not make their views
public. In this way the general public clearly got the impression that eugenics had the
stamp of approval of the scientific/genetics community, especially given that the field
was promoted by leading geneticists such as Davenport, and had gained a fair amount of
exposure in the popular media.
From this history I think two important conclusions emerge. The first is that it is
important for knowledgeable geneticists to examine claims abut the inheritance of this or
that trait (especially complex behavioral, personality and mental traits) when they are
publicized today. We have been treated for several decades at the end of the twentieth
century to a barrage of claims about the genetic basis of a multitude of human complex
behaviors, from I.Q. to criminality, aggressiveness, alcoholism, shyness, sexual
orientation, manic depression, bipolar disorder and addention deficit hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD) – even “religiosity”. Many of these claims have not held up to careful
scrutiny, and all have been criticized for the same faults for which the older eugenic
studies were found guilty. Since claims about the genetic basis of such characteristics can
have serious medical consequences – pharmacogenomics and drug treatment – it is
important that the scientific accuracy of the various claims should be clearly delineated
and exposed. This then leads to the second important lesson to come from the history of
eugenics: the geneticists who evaluate the newer studies should also make their critiques
public, and not restrict their publications only to technical journals. The importance of
this became clear in the race and I.Q. controversy in the early 1970s, when Berkeley
educational psychologist Arthur Jensen, published a highly influential article claiming
that the persistent difference in I.Q. scores between blacks and white in the United States
was due to genetics (Jensen, 1969). Because it was based on statistical analyses, Jensen’s
paper brought high praise from many who immediately saw its policy implications – as it
occurred at the height of the bussing campaign for school integration. However, rather
quickly population geneticists such as Richard Lewontin at Harvard and psychologist
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Leon Kamin at Princeton analyzed and exposed Jensen’s gross misuse of statistics (in
particular the use of heritability estimates) and reliance on older, questionable test score
data on identical twins raised apart. The rather persistent attacks throughout the early
1970s by scientists (and historians of biology), along with sociologists, psychologists and
statisticians made it clear to the general reading public that at the very least the research
promoted by Jensen and his associates was controversial among scientists. I would argue
that this open, very public criticism, was responsible for the relatively short life-span of
Jensen’s theory (it lasted for only about a decade, though it was revived by Richard
Herrnstein and Charles Murray in their book, The Bell Curve, published in 1994). So, I
think the lesson from the history of eugenics is that those with the background and
expertise to expose the fallacies in oversimplified genetic explanations should do so, as
should we all try to bring our technical skills to a broader reading public. It is one of the
most important ways in which we can insure that the misuse of our science does not
occur again.
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Figure 1
Pedigree of the Dack Family of Rural Pennsylvania (Finlayson, 1916)
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